Deontology, Political Morality, and the State Symposium: Political Theory and Criminal Punishment by Lee, Youngjae
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2010
Deontology, Political Morality, and the State
Symposium: Political Theory and Criminal
Punishment
Youngjae Lee
Fordham University School of Law, ylee@fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Youngjae Lee, Deontology, Political Morality, and the State Symposium: Political Theory and Criminal Punishment, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
385 (2010-2011)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/445
Deontology, Political Morality, and the State
Youngjae Lee*
Sometimes the government makes a policy choice, and, as a result,
innocent persons die. How should we morally assess such deaths? For
instance, is the government's choice of the reasonable doubt standard or
its decision to restrict the death penalty to certain narrow categories
responsible for deaths of innocents? If so, does the deontological norm
against harming people dictate that the government loosen the
evidentiary standard for conviction or widen the availability of capital
punishment? This Essay argues that the traditional distinctions between
intending and foreseeing harm and between causing harm and allowing
harm to occur are insufficient to absolve the state of its responsibility for
such deaths. This Essay also argues, however, that it is a mistake to
conclude from this observation that the government may be morally
required to loosen the evidentiary standard for conviction or to widen
the availability of capital punishment. Once we fully understand the
distinctive features of government as a moral agent, this Essay argues,
we will see that the government has obligations both to protect its peoplefrom crimes and respond to crimes on behalf of the people and to respect
various constraints placed on its power, including desert-based
limitations on punishment and standards of proof required for
conviction. These obligations may conflict with one another, but that
observation does not generate the conclusion that it is morally required
to punish people with death or convict people with reduced standards of
proof
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases. The Supreme Court has drawn various lines to
prohibit the imposition of capital punishment for certain types of crimes or
offenders.' For purposes of argument, assume that every time we narrow the scope
of those who can receive the death penalty, we weaken its deterrence effect,
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Richard
Dagger, Alice Ristroph, Mary Sigler, Victor Tadros, Ben Zipursky, and participants at the 2011
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Section on Jurisprudence.
1 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for
individuals under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for mentally retarded criminals); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (prohibiting the death penalty for rape).
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meaning that there would be more crime victims. 2  We also weaken the
incapacitation effect-even though those not eligible for the death penalty
presumably will stay in prison-because they may commit crimes against prison
officers and other inmates. Assuming that some of these new crime victims are
murder victims, then one might argue that the Supreme Court's decision to narrow
the scope of capital punishment is equivalent to a death sentence for innocent
victims, who would not have been victims had the restrictions never been put into
place. In other words, one might argue that the Supreme Court's decision to limit
the death penalty has resulted in deaths of innocent people.
Or, consider the Blackstone adage that it is better for ten guilty men to be
acquitted than for one innocent man to be convicted.4  Statements like this are
frequently made as support for the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal cases.5 Assuming, plausibly, that the clear and convincing evidence
standard or the preponderance of evidence standard would have the effect of
acquitting fewer guilty men and convicting more innocent men, we might further
assume that our choice to employ the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard as
opposed to some other standard would lead to an increase in criminal activities-
both by letting potential repeat offenders walk and by lowering the likelihood of
apprehension. Assuming some of these people go out and kill others, one might
argue, again, that the government's choice of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is equivalent to a death sentence for innocent victims, who would not
have been victims had the standard of proof been the preponderance of evidence
standard instead.6
In these cases, the government makes a policy choice, and, as a result,
innocent persons die. How should we think about the moral ins and outs of this
problem? Is the government's choice of the reasonable doubt standard or its
decision to restrict the death penalty to certain narrow categories responsible for
deaths of innocents? If so, does the deontological norm against harming people
dictate that the government loosen the evidentiary standard for conviction or widen
the availability of capital punishment? In a prominent, much-discussed article,
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued that the answer to this question is
yes, at least for the death penalty, and the authors conclude that, if the death
2 This is a controversial assumption. For a discussion as to how such a thing might happen,
see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 43 (1968).
See, e.g., Sharon Pian Chan & Carol M. Ostrom, Monroe Guard Complained About
Working Solo Before Inmate Killed Her, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011.
4 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 ("[F]or the law holds, that it is better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.").
5 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In this context,
I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free.").
6 See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REv. 65, 75
(2008).
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penalty deters, then "capital punishment has a strong claim to being not merely
morally permissible, but morally obligatory."7  Even though they focus their
arguments on capital punishment, it is easy to imagine a parallel argument against
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in the rest of this
Essay, I will use the phrase the "Sunstein-Vermeule challenge" to refer to the
challenge against the restrictions on conviction and punishment that focuses on
potential harms to innocent people traceable to such restrictions.
A possible response to the Sunstein-Venneule challenge is to suggest that the
kinds of conclusions that Sunstein and Vermeule draw can be avoided if we keep
in mind various distinctions found in deontological ethics. Parts II and IH review
such attempts and conclude that there are reasons to doubt that deontological ethics
as commonly understood has sufficient resources to address the Sunstein-
Vermeule challenge. Part IV argues that once we take a full account of the ways in
which the government is a moral agent with distinct features, we will see the
emptiness of the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge.
II. ACT-OMISSION AND DOING-ALLOWING DISTINCTIONS
One way to respond to the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge is by relying on the
following argument: When the state kills, it itself carries out the act of killing,
whereas when it fails to prevent a person from killing others, it does not kill; it
only fails to prevent someone from killing. Sunstein and Vermeule characterize
this distinction as the "act/omission" distinction and devote the "centerpiece"9 of
their article to attacking it.10 They argue that "unlike individuals, governments
always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for
regulating third parties,"" "[t]he only interesting or even meaningful question
government ever faces is not whether to act, but what action should be taken-
what mix of criminal justice policies government ought to pursue,"1 2 and the
decision not to have capital punishment is not an "'omission' or a 'failure to act' in
any meaningful sense."
In other words, Sunstein and Vermeule are arguing, one cannot rely on the
act-omission or action-inaction distinction to draw strong conclusions about the
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, andLife-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 750 (2005).
8 Sunstein and Vermeule themselves are interested in applying their analysis to "many
questions outside of the context of capital punishment." Id. at 705. They in fact discuss both
constitutional restrictions on the death penalty, id., and the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement in advancing their arguments. Id at 727-28.
9 Id. at 709.
'0 Id. at 720-24.
" Id at 721.
12 Id. at 722.
13 id.
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morality of government actions because the government cannot help but act. It
seems to me that Sunstein and Vermeule are right to argue that there are many
difficulties with applying the act-omission distinction in this context. For instance,
as Sunstein and Vermeule point out, capital punishment is one of several controls
the government has at its disposal, and depending on how frequently this
instrument is used, it may increase or decrease the risk of people being killed by
others. 14 The government's decision to prohibit the imposition of the penalty of
death on mentally retarded offenders thus can be characterized as adjusting the
availability of the death penalty, hence changing the risk of future crimes, and the
action-inaction distinction is thus not terribly informative.
The same analysis can be applied to the reasonable doubt standard. Some
might argue that convicting people on the basis of anything less than what is
required by the reasonable doubt standard is a wrongful action, whereas when
acquitted defendants commit additional crimes, the state has not done anything.
But the government has no choice but to act in this scenario. It is not just that an
"acquittal" itself is an action as opposed to an inaction, as Sunstein and Vermeule
observe.15 It is also that the government has to determine when considering burden
of proof issues the appropriate ratio between the number of innocents wrongly
convicted and the number of guilty wrongly acquitted. The Blackstone ratio is set
at 1:10; the government may decide that the ratio should instead be 1:1, 1:2, 1:5, or
1:100. Assuming that some of these wrongly acquitted individuals go out and
commit more crimes, the government can control the amount of risk of people
being crime victims by adjusting the ratio through different levels of required
proof. In other words, by insisting on the reasonable doubt standard, the
government "acts" in that it picks a particular ratio between wrongly convicted and
wrongly acquitted. Therefore, Sunstein and Vermeule's argument against the
existence of the act-omission distinction for the government is valid, and even
Carol Steiker, who has written a spirited critique of Sunstein and Vermeule's
arguments, seems to agree with them that the act-omission distinction is powerless
in this debate.' 6
There is only one problem.' 7 The argument misidentifies the target. It is clear
that the main opponents Sunstein and Vermeule have in mind when they attack the
14 Id. at 721-23.
" Id. at 727-28.
16 Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751, 757 (2005).
17 One problem with Sunstein and Vermeule's argument that I will not focus on in this Essay
is that their argument proves too much. Take speed limits for example. In 1995, Congress repealed
all federal speed limits, and a number of states subsequently raised their speed limits above the pre-
existing federal limits. A recent study argues that the repeal of the speed limit led to a 3.2% increase
in road fatalities and estimates that we could attribute 12,545 fatalities between 1995 and 2005 to the
repeal. Lee S. Friedman et al., Long-Term Effects of Repealing the National Maximum Speed Limit
in the United States, 99 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 1626, 1626 (2009). Sunstein and Vermeule are not very
clear about the scope of their arguments, but by denying the act-omission distinction and arguing that
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action-inaction distinction are deontologists. They say, for instance, that "[t]he
unstated assumption animating much opposition to capital punishment among
intuitive deontologists is that capital punishment counts as an 'action' by the state,
while the refusal to impose it counts as an 'omission. But the action-inaction
distinction is not quite the distinction that deontologists are likely to have in mind
when they distinguish between state acts of killing and the state's failure to prevent
killing. While the distinction goes by many names,' 9 the relevant distinction here
is that between doing and allowing, which is different from action and omission or
action and inaction. They are of course related, 20 but the moral distinction that
seems to do the work in doing-allowing scenarios does not neatly map onto the
distinction between action and inaction. One may do something without engaging
in an action and one may allow something to happen through action.21 Therefore,
the core intuition that there is a moral distinction between doing and allowing,
which Jeff McMahan recently characterized as one of the "twin pillars[] of
traditional nonconsequentialism," 22 survives Sunstein and Vermeule's effective
dismantling of the action-inaction distinction for the state.
What, then, of the core intuition underlying the doing-allowing distinction?
Can we rely on that distinction to defend the relevant constraints against the
Sunstein-Vermeule challenge? As Philippa Foot suggests, what is crucial about it
the government is essentially "killing" innocent persons any time its policy choice leads to deaths,
Sunstein and Vermeule seem to be committed to the view that the federal govemment "killed" those
12,545 innocent people by repealing the speed limits and that a low (or even an absurdly low) federal
speed limit would have "a strong claim to being not merely morally permissible, but morally
obligatory." Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 750. One obvious conclusion to draw from their
arguments is that deontological ethics, when applied to the government, has such absurd implications
and is therefore inapplicable to government policy decisions. Perhaps this is not a conclusion that
they would discourage given their evident sympathies to consequentialism. However, Sunstein and
Vermeule do not acknowledge this next step in their arguments, presumably because acknowledging
it would expose the disingenuousness of their repeated insistence that "the choice between
consequentialist and deontological approaches to morality is not crucial here," id at 706, that their
claims "do not depend on accepting consequentialism," id. at 718, and that their "argument does not
challenge deontological claims as such." Id. at 738.
18 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 707.
19 See Samuel Scheffler, Doing andAllowing, 114 ETHICS 215, 215 (2004).
20 See Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and
Allowing, 98 PHIL. REv. 287 (1989), reprinted in WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 149
(1993).
21 See Philippa Foot, Morality, Action, and Outcome, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A
TRIBUTE TO J.L. MACKIE 23, 24 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985), reprinted in MORAL DILEMMAS AND
OTHER Topics IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 88, 89 (2002); Philippa Foot, The Problem ofAbortion and the
Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OxFORD REv. 5 (1967), reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 26 (1978) [hereinafter Foot, Problem of
Abortion]; Jeff McMahan, Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid, 103 ETHICS 250, 251-52
(1993).
22 Jeff McMahan, Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War, 23 PHIL. PERSP. 345, 352
(2009). The other is the intending-foreseeing distinction. See id.
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seems to be whether a person "may or may not be 'the agent' of harm that befalls
someone else."23 More specifically, as she adds, "it makes all the difference
whether those who are going to die if we act in a certain way will die as a result of
a sequence that we originate or of one that we allow to continue, it being of course
something that did not start by our agency." 24
So, in the case of capital punishment, if the state's failure to deter a murderer
has led to one more murder taking place, the state stands in one kind of
relationship of responsibility to the killing; if the state executes a person, the state
stands in quite another, different relationship of responsibility to the killing.
Similarly, if the state's failure to convict a person leads to one more murder taking
place, the state's relationship to that killing is different from its relationship to
someone the state convicts on the basis of proof that falls below the reasonable
doubt standard. One might, then, defend the restrictions on capital punishment and
the reasonable doubt standard against the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge on the
ground that the state is prohibited from killing a person (who does not deserve to
be killed) or convicting a person (whose guilt is not beyond a reasonable doubt)
through its own agency in order to prevent a different agent from harming others
through his or her own agency.
How well does this argument work? It seems that there are difficulties. To
see this, consider the following hypothetical, which I will call "Sophie Variation
1," as it is a variation on an incident from the novel Sophie's Choice.25 There is a
war. Sophie is taken to a prison camp. A sadistic prison guard decides to free her,
but before he does that, he gives her a choice. If she shoots a particular prisoner,
named Bruno, he will let five children (whom she has never met) go. If she
refuses, Bruno will be let go, and the children will have to stay in prison, where the
conditions are terrible and there is a significant chance that they will be killed by
other inmates, guards, or disease sometime before the war ends. Is the
deontological constraint against killing so strong that it prohibits her from killing
Bruno? Perhaps.
Consider, then, Sophie Variation 2. Sophie Variation 2 is identical to Sophie
Variation 1 except for the fact that the five children are her own children. By
killing Bruno, she can liberate her five children to whom she owes some duty of
protection. If she now refuses to kill Bruno, can we say that she has made the
morally correct decision simply because she refuses to kill? What makes Sophie
Variation 2 difficult is that either way she chooses, she would be in violation of
some duty-either a negative duty not to kill or a positive duty to protect her
children from harm, and even if it is the case that killing is worse than allowing a
23 Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
177, 178 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984), reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, MORAL
DILEMMAS AND OTHER ToPics IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 78, 80 (2002).
24 Id. at 81-82; see also Scheffler, supra note 19.
25 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979).
[Vol 8:385390
DEONTOLOGY POLITICAL MORALITY, AND THE STATE
killing to occur, this may be a situation where the positive obligations owed to her
26five children are weighty enough to override the negative duty owed to Bruno.
Of course, just because one owes a positive obligation to protect five people
from harm does not mean that one may kill one person to save those five. If we
think about the famous organ transplant hypothetical in which we are asked to
consider whether a surgeon may kill one person in order to use his organs to save
five,27 the conclusion that the surgeon is not permitted to do so is the correct
conclusion even though the five he could save are presumably his own patients
(and whether the one whose organ he needs is his patient or not, similarly, seems
immaterial). And the conclusion is the same even if these five are his own
children. Now, in this particular variation, the fact that he is a doctor might
complicate the picture since there are special duties associated with his
institutional role not to harm a patient under his care in order to care for his own
loved ones. In order to avoid this complication, we can imagine a father who is
considering killing a person in order to take his organs to give to his five children
who need the organs to survive. The doctor who is doing the transplant will not
know where the organs come from and will not ask. May the father proceed?
Again, the answer here is no.
So, along these lines, one might argue that the correct answer to Sophie
Variation 2 is that she is neither permitted nor required to kill the designated
prisoner. Consider, then, Sophie Variation 3, in which Bruno is someone who, at
the beginning of the war, took advantage of the chaos of the new situation and
killed someone Sophie knows (but not very well). Because of the war, the murder
was never investigated, and he was never prosecuted. Sophie now has to choose
between killing Bruno and freeing her five children from the prison. Is she
permitted to kill him? Is she required to kill him? If the answer is that the
deontological constraint against killing still controls, does the answer change if the
murder victim was not an acquaintance but Sophie's husband? Does Sophie have
a moral obligation to refrain from killing a man who recently killed her husband
and was never punished even if her failing to kill him would mean that her children
may die in prison? Or, yet another variation: What if the victim was one of her
children? Does Sophie have a moral obligation to refrain from killing a man who
recently killed one of her children even though her failing to kill him would mean
that her other children may die in prison?
Now consider Sophie Variation 4, which is just like Sophie Variation 3 except
that Bruno is not a murderer for certain. Instead, Bruno is someone who may have
26 Cf Foot, Problem ofAbortion, supra note 21, at 29-30. This conclusion is consistent with
the standard view in law that while in many cases a person commits a wrong in doing harm but does
not when merely allowing harm to occur, the significance of the distinction is considerably weakened
when there is a special relationship between the agent in question and the victim. See, e.g., JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 120-21
(2010); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMNAL LAW 331-32 (5th ed. 2010).
27 JuDITH JARvIs THOMSON, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS
IN MORAL THEORY 94, 95 (William Parent ed., 1986).
2011] 391
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
murdered Sophie's husband but was not apprehended. Sophie is not certain that it
was him, and she knows that the evidence against him is not sufficient to win a
criminal conviction in a tribunal that applies the reasonable doubt standard.
However, she believes that Bruno did kill her husband, and it is more likely than
not that he is the one. Is she permitted to kill Bruno? Is she required to kill
Bruno? Keep in mind that the preponderance of evidence standard is not a trivial
standard, and it is something that we have no trouble using in the civil context
when deciding to impose enormous financial burdens on persons and entities.
We are considering these hypothetical scenarios in order to evaluate the
various constraints the state places on the institution of punishment. The
constraints are 1) narrowing the scope of capital punishment to the narrowest, most
deserving group of offenders and 2) the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for convictions. The question here is whether we can defend these
constraints against the objection that keeping these constraints in place amounts to
a failure to prevent killings of innocent people. The defense strategy we are
considering is the distinction between doing and allowing harm, and Sophie
Variations 3 and 4 (and subvariations) are designed to show that the distinction is a
questionable way of defending the constraints against the Sunstein-Vermeule
challenge.
In these scenarios, imprisonment and potential death from imprisonment of
her children are merely allowed by Sophie, whereas the killing of Bruno would be
done by Sophie herself. Yet Sophie owes her children a duty of protection, and her
positive duty may make it permissible or even mandatory for her to violate the
negative duty owed to Bruno. We may justify the state's loosening of its
restrictions on the death penalty or the burden of proof for conviction along the
same lines. The doing-allowing distinction seems most significant in stranger-
stranger situations and loses its force as the nature of the relationship between the
actor and the victim becomes that of a protector-protectee relationship. The
government may be large, impersonal, and bureaucratic, but it seems incorrect to
characterize the crime victim-government relationship as that between complete
strangers. In fact, it is not just that the government and its citizens are not
strangers. Protecting its citizens from harm, from both internal and external
sources, is considered to be one of the main tasks the government owes its citizens.
The state thus has a duty to provide physical security to its citizens, and if the
state has to choose between killing a criminal-someone who is not innocent-
who does not deserve such a harsh punishment and allowing killings of its citizens,
it is not so obvious that the mere doing-allowing distinction can justify the state's
insistence on respecting the constraint on administration of the death penalty.
Similarly, the state owes a duty of physical security to its citizens, and if the state
has to choose between conviction of a defendant under the preponderance of
evidence standard (as opposed to the reasonable doubt standard) and allowing
more killings of its citizens to occur, it is again not so obvious that the doing-
392 [Vol 8:385
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allowing distinction can justify the state's insistence on the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.28
III. PURPOSEFUL-NONPURPOSEFUL AND INTENDING-FORESEEING DISTINCTIONS
Another way to respond to the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge may be the
argument articulated by Carol Steiker, who criticizes Sunstein and Vermeule for
abandoning "the moral distinction between purposeful and nonpurposeful
action." 29  She explains that "[i]n the capital punishment context, . . . the
government knowingly or recklessly loses or 'takes' lives by not executing ... ,
but it purposefully takes lives by executing" and argues that "the difference
between purposeful and nonpurposeful harms remains crucial."3 0 To support her
claim, she gives the following example:
Suppose a mother fails to protect her child from abuse by the mother's
boyfriend, who intentionally murders the child.... Because the mother
has an ongoing duty to protect her child (the way the government has a
duty to protect its citizens), it is no defense for her to say that her failure
to act was merely an omission for which she was not responsible.
28 Now, is it not the case that the state owes a duty to protect both criminals and non-criminals
alike? In that case, Sophie Variations 3 and 4 may not be analogous because in the case of the state's
relationship to criminals, the state owes them a duty of protection, whereas Sophie does not have that
kind of obligation towards Bruno. This is a complication, and a full exploration of this issue would
take us far afield, but I do not believe it makes a difference for our purposes. To see this point,
consider Sophie Variation 5, which is identical to Sophie Variation 3, except that Bruno is not a
stranger but is in fact one of her children. May Sophie now kill Bruno to save her other children? Or
does the fact that Sophie owes all her children a positive obligation mean that Sophie cannot kill him?
I do not think that this second conclusion follows. The reason she perhaps may not kill Bruno is
because she may not kill any human being, but the fact that she has a duty to protect Bruno from
harm does not give her an additional reason not to kill Bruno. This conclusion may sound
counterintuitive, but we can think of it the following way. Say I owe you money. Instead of paying
you back, I steal your money. Have I violated my obligation to pay you back? The answer is no-at
least not yet. The only duty I violated is the negative duty not to steal. What if I pay you back and
steal from you at the same time? I think I have fulfilled my obligation to pay you while
simultaneously violating my obligation not to steal from you. In Sophie Variation 5, then, Sophie
may fulfill her positive obligation to protect Bruno by doing the best job she can to free herself from
the terrible dilemma the prison guard places her in by, say, attempting to help all her children,
including Bruno, escape. Assuming that she has run out of such options, then we may morally
evaluate her decision to kill Bruno in the same way we would had Bruno not been her child. This is
not the same as arguing that there is no moral difference between a parent murdering his or her child
and a person murdering a stranger. There may be morally relevant features that differentiate the two
cases, such as special vulnerability of children to harm from their own parents. In other words, one
could say that a violation of a duty x owes to y in a given instance is worse than a violation of the
same duty x owes to z, but that is not the same as saying that the two violations involve two different
obligations.
29 Steiker, supra note 16, at 759.
30 Id. at 757.
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However, the degree of her moral culpability depends on her mens rea: if
she did not know, but should have known, of the risk of death to her
child, she would be guilty of negligent homicide; if she knew of and
consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death to her child, she
would be guilty of reckless homicide (manslaughter); if she knew to a
practical certainty that her child would die, she would be guilty of
second-degree murder; and if her purpose in failing to act was to bring
about the death of her child, she would be guilty of first-degree murder.3 1
She then concludes, "To acknowledge that the mother had a duty to act to
prevent the intentional murder of her child by another is not and should not be the
same as saying that her omission constituted intentional murder." 32
What is the objection here? It cannot just be the argument that a purposeful
killing is worse than a nonpurposeful killing. If that were the argument, then it
would not necessarily contradict the notion that the government should engage in
one purposeful killing to prevent ten (or five or even two) purposeful killings by
individuals, and this is clearly the position that Steiker is trying to avoid. Perhaps
Steiker's argument is not simply that a purposeful killing is worse than a
nonpurposeful killing but whether the state intentionally killing a person is more
blameworthy than the state engaging in an act knowing that it will result in persons
being killed. Her statement that "those who purposefully transgress are more
blameworthy [than those who do the same nonpurposefully] because they have
affirmatively chosen their course of action and its results" renders support to this
interpretation.34
The problem, even when stated in these terms, is that merely saying that the
state engaging in a purposeful killing is worse than the state engaging in a
nonpurposeful killing cannot settle the issue in Steiker's favor because the question
about tradeoffs still remains. To see this point, suppose that we are in a terrible
world where all but twenty Picasso paintings have been destroyed. I am in
possession of two of them. One day, for fun, I set one painting on fire and pay a
random man going home from New York to New Jersey on a ferry to carry the
other one and deliver it to a friend of mine in New Jersey. The man, having
pocketed the money and not realizing what he is carrying, throws it into the river
and the painting is lost or at least irreparably damaged. What I did is worse in the
first instance than in the second because at least in the second instance what I did
was merely reckless or negligent.
" Id. at 757-58.
32 Id. at 758.
3 A common label for constraints that have this form is "agent-relative." See SHELLY
KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MoRAUTY 74-75 (1989); THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 175-80
(1986).
3 Steiker, supra note 16, at 759.
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Now change the facts a bit. There are twenty Picasso paintings. I was in
possession of all twenty. Nineteen of them have been stolen by a radical art
student friend of mine who calls me and says that he plans to go on a yacht on a
stormy day with all nineteen paintings in order to see "how they hold up" in
extreme conditions. He tells me, however, if I destroy the painting I still have and
send the remains to him by midnight, he will return all nineteen and use the
destroyed painting for his "next project," which he will finish "maybe" in the next
five to ten years. I have known him long enough to know that he is a man of his
word, so I destroy the painting in order to eliminate the risk of nineteen paintings
being lost or damaged in the water somewhere. May I destroy one painting
intentionally to save the nineteen, which may or may not be destroyed without my
action? Should I? Must I? The proposition that intentionally destroying a
painting is worse than being negligent or reckless about the well-being of a
painting does not settle this question and probably generates the wrong answer if
interpreted too stringently.
Therefore, Steiker's argument that a purposeful killing is worse than a
nonpurposeful killing is not an effective response to the Sunstein-Vermeute
challenge. What we need instead is an argument in the form that one is prohibited
from intentionally killing someone even if doing so would prevent foreseeable
killings. This argument, of course, relies on the classic deontological distinction
between "intending" and "foreseeing" harm. When the government executes a
person, it kills intentionally, whereas when the government's restriction of the
death penalty leads to a killing, the killing is merely foreseeable. Similarly, if the
government imprisons a person on a basis of proof that falls short of the reasonable
doubt standard, then the government intentionally imprisons despite limited
evidence, but if its stringent standard of proof leads to acquittals of killers who
murder innocent victims, the government does not kill intentionally, even though
the killings may be foreseeable. If it is the case that one may not kill even if it
means foreseeable killings would be prevented, then it seems that we have an
answer to the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge.36
Putting the inquiry in this way, however, highlights a number of difficulties.
First, there is the question whether we can coherently maintain that the state has
"intentions" in a way that is at least analogous to the way persons have
intentions. Without an ability to articulate what it means for the state to have an
3s Legal scholars tend to use "purposeful" and "nonpurposeful," and the term
"nonpurposeful" encompasses knowing, reckless, negligent, and purely faultless. Philosophers, on
the other hand, tend to use "intentional" and "foreseeable." I treat these as equivalent dichotomies
for the purposes of this article. Cf Douglas Husak, The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing That
Intentions Are Irrelevant to Permissibility, 3 CRM. L. & PlUL. 51, 58 n.31 (2009).
36 Even though, as we will see below, Sunstein and Vermeule focus on the act-omission
distinction in their article, they also appear at times to deny the intending-foreseeing distinction.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 722-23; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Deterring Murder: A Reply, 58 STAN. L. REv. 847, 849-52 (2005).
37 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 119-46 (1999).
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"intention," it appears difficult, at least at first glance, to make any moral argument
that relies on the intending-foreseeing distinction. Second, there is a long-running,
unresolved debate in moral philosophy about whether intention is relevant to
permissibility,38 and the strategy of relying on the intending-foreseeing distinction
appears to rest on the belief that intention is relevant to permissibility. Third, even
if intention is relevant to permissibility for individuals, it is unclear whether the
same is the case for the state.39 Fourth, while intention may be morally significant
even if it has no relevance to permissibility,40 the ways in which intention is
morally significant may not translate well to the context of state actions.4 1
Despite the difficulties, it seems to me that there are ways to devise an
account by which we can coherently maintain that the state has intentions42 and
that such intentions are either relevant to permissibility or morally significant in a
way relevant to our discussion.4 3 I will not attempt such an account here and will
sidestep these issues, as I think that, even if these problems are overcome, there is
a more serious problem, which can be seen by reexamining Sophie Variations 3
and 4 and recasting them in terms of the intending-foreseeing distinction.
So, in Sophie Variation 3, we would ask whether Sophie has a moral
obligation to refrain from intentionally killing Bruno, who recently killed her
husband or one of her children and was never punished, even if it is foreseeable
that her failing to kill him would mean that her children may die in prison. And in
Sophie Variation 4, we would ask whether Sophie has a moral obligation to refrain
from intentionally killing Bruno, who may have killed her husband but was never
punished, even if it is foreseeable that her failing to kill him would mean that her
children may die in prison. As we saw above, what makes Sophie Variations 3 and
4 difficult is that either way she chooses, she would be in violation of some duty-
either a negative duty not to kill or a positive duty to protect her children from
harm, and even if it is the case that intentionally killing a person is worse than
38 See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 8-88
(2008); THOMSON, supra note 27, at 94; McMahan, supra note 22, at 347-59; Victor Tadros,
Wrongdoing and Motivation, in PHILOSOPHicAL FouNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff& Stuart
Green eds., forthcoming Apr. 2011); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral
Arguments, 109 ETHICS 497, 514-17 (1999) [hereinafter Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide];
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 283, 293-96 (1991).
3 See David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEGAL THEORY 69 (2007).
4 See SCANLON, supra note 38, at 37-88; Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note
38, at 517.
41 Enoch, supra note 39, at 84-91.
42 See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in SOCIALITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 14 (2000); David Copp, On the Agency of
Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from "Normative Autonomy," 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL.
194 (2006); J. Angelo Corlett, Collective Moral Responsibility, 32 J. Soc. PHIL. 573 (2001); Philip
Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETiCs 171 (2007).
43 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000); SCANLON, supra note 38, at 52-56.
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failing to prevent a foreseeable killing from occurring, the positive obligations may
outweigh the negative duty owed to Bruno."
We may justify the state's loosening of various restrictions on its criminal
justice system along the same grounds. The safety of its citizens (or the safety of
people within its territory) from criminal harm is the government's business. And
when the state has the choice of intentionally executing a non-innocent criminal as
a way of preventing foreseeable deaths of innocent citizens under the state's
protection, it seems that the state should not be able to merely cite the intending-
foreseeing distinction to evade its responsibility. In short, the efficacy of the
intending-foreseeing distinction as an answer to the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge
may be doubted for the same reasons for doubting the doing-allowing distinction.
What is the upshot of all this? It seems that the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge
cannot be easily disposed of through the doing-allowing and intending-foreseeing
distinctions found within traditional deontological ethics. Now, these are
complicated issues that implicate some of the most contested issues in moral
philosophy, and I concede that I have not given a knock-down argument in favor
of my positions in this small amount of space, especially given that intuitions may
differ on some of these cases. All I seek to accomplish here is to point out some
reasons to doubt that a mere reliance on these traditional deontological distinctions
is sufficient to meet the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge in order to explore other
ways of meeting the challenge.
IV. PUNISHMENT, THE STATE, AND POLITICAL MORALITY
If it is indeed the case, as I have suggested, that the intending-foreseeing and
doing-allowing distinctions cannot answer the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge, does
that mean that increasing the availability of capital punishment and lessening the
burden of proof required for conviction may be "not merely morally permissible,
but morally obligatory," as Sunstein and Vermeule would argue?45
Not so fast. The strength of the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge lies in their
observation of "the distinctive features of government as a moral agent."4 Their
mistake lies in their failure to take this insight far enough. The government is
distinctive, and once we fully understand the ways in which the government is
distinctive, we will see that the various substantive and procedural safeguards
guaranteed in our criminal justice system are much more resilient to the Sunstein-
Vermeule challenge than they claim.
In order to understand the constraints placed on the criminal process, we must
first understand the nature of criminal law and the institution of punishment. The
criminal justice system has many characteristics, but we might say its three key
features are that it is coercive, judgmental, and preemptive. First, the coercive
4 Cf Foot, Problem ofAbortion, supra note 21, at 29-30.
45 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 750.
4 Id. at 721.
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aspect takes place most dramatically and obviously in the process of apprehension
and punishment. We routinely send people to prisons in this country for five,
fifteen, twenty-five years, or for life. Sometimes we even kill them. All of this is
done by the government in our name and in the name of upholding the rule of law.
Second, the criminal justice system is judgmental in the sense that when we
punish, we blame, condemn, and stigmatize the offenders as recipients of blame
and punishment.47 And by stigmatizing the offenders, punishment gets "personal"
and sends the message that the act being punished reflects badly on the actor.48
Finally, the criminal justice system is preemptive-not in the sense of "taking
place before" as in "preemptive attack" but in the sense of supersession or
replacement as in "federal preemption." That is, state punishment is preemptive in
that it acts as the exclusive agent licensed to respond to criminal wrongdoing
through punishment, and private individuals are prohibited from doing the same.
Even though the idea of retribution-that people should receive what they
deserve-appears neutral on its face on the question of who should be the one
giving wrongdoers what they deserve, the government is the only legitimate
punisher, and the law prohibits private individuals from taking the law into their
own hands.
Why does the criminal justice system have the peculiar shape that it does? A
full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Essay, and only a rough
treatment is given here. First, criminal law plays an important role in preserving
physical security through its system of prohibitions and punishments. Fulfilling
this function frequently requires use of coercion and explains the criminal justice
system's coercive aspect. Second, as many have argued, an important function
that criminal law serves is to displace feelings of resentment and desires for
vengeance by responding to wrongdoing through the institution of punishment.49
As John Gardner puts it, "The blood feud, the vendetta, the duel, the revenge, the
lynching: for the elimination of these modes of retaliation, more than anything
else, the criminal law as we know it today came into existence."50 A core purpose
of criminal law and punishment is thus to manage punitive and retaliatory
emotions of those who have been victimized by wrongdoers, and whether criminal
law succeeds or fails in a society depends, not entirely of course but importantly,
47 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MoNIST 397 (1965), reprinted in
DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970).
48 See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 (2005); John Gardner, On the General
Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 205,
236-37 (Antony Duffed., 1998).
49 John Gardner, Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING
THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 31 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds.,
1998), reprinted in JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CRIMINAL LAW 213, 213-14 (2007).
so Id. at 213.
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on how well it responds to punitive emotions of its citizens.51 This displacement
function explains the preemptive and judgmental aspects.
We cannot understand why we have the kinds of substantive and procedural
safeguards we have in our criminal justice system unless we keep this big picture
in mind. The government enjoys an enormous amount of power to interfere with
peoples' lives with force and to stigmatize individuals with its stamp of
blameworthiness, and it prohibits others from doing the same. And in order for the
government to maintain its exclusive status as a legitimate holder of this power, it
has to use its force in a certain specified way. That is, before the state can exercise
acts of violence and attach stigma to individuals, we demand that the state be able
to justify the acts it is about to take by correctly identifying wrongdoers. The proof
beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is generated from this demand. We also
demand that the state ensure that the force of its condemnation fairly match the
level of blameworthiness of offenders. The proportionality-based limitations on
the death penalty are generated from this demand.
Therefore, fundamental legal protections that are promised to individuals,
such as the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement or the principle that
people not be punished more than they deserve, are not merely requirements that
flow directly from laws of morality that dictate how individuals ought to treat one
another. They also spell out the proper relationship between the government and
the governed, and they are among the many conditions that attach to the
government's exclusive possession and use of the power to criminalize and punish.
These conditions, in turn, take the form of constraints that are resistant to trade-
offs in order to protect their viability as restrictions on the government's power to
blame. For one thing, punitive passions, while frequently rooted in one's correct
sense that a moral wrong has been done, can be excessive and driven by other less
desirable, yet no less common, sentiments such as cruelty, sadism, inhumanity, and
racial hatred and prejudice. 52 Such sentiments may drive punishments to go well
beyond what offenders deserve. The state also faces tremendous pressures to
reduce the incidence of crime, and this could lead to excessive and unwarranted
uses of violence by the state. Unless we treat the constraints against convicting
without sufficiently convincing proof and punishing people more than they deserve
as close to inviolable, such limitations on criminalization and punishment will give
too often and will not be able to provide meaningful limitations on the
government's power to criminalize and punish.
The resulting picture is thus quite complex. The government's role as the
exclusive agent of punishment means that it faces pressures from at least two
directions. On one hand, the government has an obligation to provide physical
s' Id. at 216 ("[Tlhe criminal law's medicine must be strong enough to control the toxins of
bitterness and resentment which course through the veins of those who are wronged, or else the urge
to retaliate in kind will persist unchecked.").
52 Cf FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MoRALymY 43-49 (Keith Ansell-Pearson
ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1887).
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security to its citizens and respond adequately to wrongdoing on behalf of its
citizens, who are prohibited from using force to defend themselves from and
retaliate against those who would or do wrong them. On the other hand, the
government can preserve the legitimacy of its status as the holder of the monopoly
on the power to punish only by respecting various restrictions placed on its use of
force, such as the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement and desert-based
limitations on punishment. These two commitments, by design, pull the
government in different directions. Providing physical security may sometimes be
done more efficiently and effectively if the state can at times ignore various
substantive and procedural safeguards placed on its power, but if it starts abusing
its position of power like that, its status as the legitimate holder of the power to
criminalize and punish will be threatened. Yet there will be times when respecting
these safeguards may seem downright irresponsible-a dereliction of duty-in that
they may get in the way of convicting and punishing wrongdoers.
What does all this have to do with the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge? What
this account shows is that the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge, the gist of which is the
argument that the government's obligation to prevent crime may lead it in the
direction violating these constraints, reflects a valid but banal and misleadingly
incomplete truth. Yes, the government has a moral obligation to potential crime
victims, and, yes, seeing that the government fulfills its obligation to protect
persons from criminal activities may pull the government in the direction of
violating substantive and procedural limitations on the government's power to
punish. But this observation, while correct, is trivial, akin to an observation that
our three branches of the government sometimes work at cross-purposes. We can
in fact run the same argument backwards to argue that, "on certain empirical
assumptions," non-enforcement of the criminal law "may be morally required" in
order to prevent, say, accidental wrongful convictions, which may be inevitable
(that is, foreseeable) byproducts of enforcing the criminal law.
Moreover, the Sunstein-Vermeule challenge tells only half the story. The
reason these substantive and procedural limitations exist in the first place is
because the government is put in charge of criminalization and punishment, and
the government has the power it does only on condition that it respect such
limitations. To illustrate this point, imagine a parent who sends his child to a
summer camp. The parent, by sending the child to the summer camp, gives the
camp operators permission to exercise their discretion to care for the well-being of
s3 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 705. Some might argue that this is unfair given that
a significant portion of the Sunstein-Vermeule argument has to do with giving content to such
"empirical assumptions." Id. Without an analogous empirical showing, one might object, this kind
of reverse argument cannot get off the ground. This objection would have some traction had Sunstein
and Vermeule taken a position on whether "in fact, capital punishment deters murder." Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 36, at 848. But they explicitly state that they "do not mean to take a stand" on
that question. Id. They instead describe the question they are addressing as "how the moral issues
should be assessed if deterrence could be established." Id. at 849. Their main argument, in other
words, is conceptual, as is my critique here.
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the child in various situations that may arise while the child is at camp. The
arrangement also imposes on the camp operators an obligation to take care of the
child. Now imagine that the parent attaches the following condition: Before the
camp operators give the child any kind of medication, they have to seek his
permission except in emergency situations. Built into this arrangement is a
foreseeable conflict between the camp operators' obligation to care for the child
and their obligation to seek the parent's permission before giving the child medical
care because there may be times when waiting for the parent's permission would
interfere with what is optimal for the child from a medical perspective. A parent
may recognize this downside yet for a variety of reasons still insist on the
condition.
The government's obligation to protect, similarly, goes hand in hand with the
existence of these limitations on the ways in which the government can exercise its
power to protect. The tension between the government's obligation to protect and
the requirement to act consistently with various side constraints is built into the
system by design, and they are two sides of the same coin. The Sunstein-Vermeule
challenge badly misses the mark because it fails to acknowledge the way in which
the obligation to provide physical security is deeply intertwined with certain
procedural and substantive restrictions on the government's use of force. The
existence of the obligation to protect depends on the existence of the restrictions
because without the restrictions, the government would not be put in a privileged
position to provide physical security.
None of this suggests that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or various desert-limitations on amounts of punishment cannot be revised. It is
possible that these are the wrong types of limitations to have, and a renegotiation
of the terms of the citizen-state relationship may be called for. But that is precisely
the point. The correct way to think about this problem is in terms of devising
appropriate terms of the relationship between the state and its citizens, and an
abstract deontological argumentation focusing only on the number of lives lost due
to one's action or inaction and on the permissibility of such action or inaction
cannot help us understand the nature of the problem.
I am not denying that deontological ethics is deeply related to questions of
political morality. Of course it is.M The point rather is that whether we are talking
about criminal law, "environmental quality[,] appropriations to highway safety[,]
relief of poverty,". "occupational risks, terrorism, or racial discrimination,"56 the
moral significance of a government policy that imposes or fails to prevent harm
cannot be assessed without having an understanding of the distinct political and
institutional features of each context.
54 How moral and political principles actually relate is a complicated question that I cannot
answer here. Cf Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PmL. & PuB. AFF. 113, 126-27
(2005).
ss Sunstein & Verneule, supra note 7, at 705.
6 Id. at 707.
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V. CONCLUSION
When the government makes a policy choice, and, as a result, innocent
persons die, how should we morally assess the deaths? I have argued in this Essay
that traditional distinctions between intending and foreseeing harm and between
causing harm and allowing harm to occur cannot do the work of absolving the state
of its responsibility for such deaths. I have also argued that it is a mistake to
conclude from this observation, as Sunstein and Vermeule do, that the government
may be morally required to loosen the evidentiary standard for conviction or to
widen the availability of capital punishment.
Once we fully understand the political and institutional context within which
various procedural and substantive safeguards on the criminal justice system
reside, I have argued, we will see that the government has a moral obligation to
protect its people from crimes and to respond to crimes on behalf of its people and
that it has a moral obligation to respect various constraints placed on its power,
including desert-based limitations on punishment and standards of proof required
for conviction. These two obligations may get in the way of each other, but
concluding from this that it is morally required to discard such constraints would
be to repeat the mistake that Sunstein and Vermeule themselves warn against-to
fail to appreciate sufficiently "the distinctive features of government as a moral
agent."57 In other words, as John Rawls has famously remarked, "the correct
regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.""
" Id. at 721.
58 JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 25 (rev. ed. 1999).
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